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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature oftlze Case 
This is a Federal Employers Liability Act ("FELA") case. Plaintiff/Appellant Craig L. 
Mulford ("Mr. Mulford") was an employee of Defendant/Respondent Union Pacific Railroad 
("UP"). UP employed Mr. Mulford as a machinist, and he was required to repair various types of 
equipment and machinery. In March, 2009, while working for UP, Mr. Mulford tripped over a piece 
of equipment UP failed to properly store, and suffered injuries to his knees. As a result, Mr. 
Mulford sued UP to recover damages. 
In May, 2012, the case was tried before ajury. During voir dire, the District Court seated 
Lorin Taylor in the jury. Mr. Taylor served also as the presiding juror. The District Court overruled 
Mr. Mulford's objection to seating Mr. Taylor for cause based on his implied and actual bias. The 
District Court did not excuse Mr. Taylor based on consanguinity with UP within the fourth degree, 
as Mr. Taylor was the son of one of UP's current employees. Also, the District Court did not excuse 
Mr. Taylor due to his actual bias. Mr. Taylor stated during voir dire that it was his personal opinion 
Mr. Mulford was not entitled to compensation for pain and suffering. The District Court committed 
reversible en'or in failing to exercise its statutory duty to remove Mr. Taylor for cause. 
Additionally, during the trial, the District COUl1 allowed UP, over Mr. Mulford's objections, 
to present to the jury evidence that Mr. Mulford received railroad retirement benefits ("RRB"). The 
District Court allowed this, despite the fact that such evidence was inadmissible as a collateral 
source, which the District Court, prior to trial, ordered would and could not be offered by UP to the 
Jury. 
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As a result of the District Court's enors, the jury retumed a verdict in favor of UP. 
The Course of the Proceedings Below 
On October 30,2009, Mr. Mulford filed his complaint, which UP answered. R., Vol. I, pp. 
1-14. The parties engaged in discovery. On March 23, 2012, Mr. Mulford filed his initial motions 
in limine., which included Mr. Mulford's motion requesting the District Court preclude UP from 
presenting evidence to the jury Mr. Mulford was RRB benefits. R., Vol.l, pp. 20-194. UP opposed 
the motion. R., pp. 195-293. On May 10,2012, the District Court entered its order regarding Mr. 
Mulford's motions in limine. R., Vol. II, pp. 305-310. The District Court concluded that RRB 
benefits qualified as a collateral source and that evidence ofMr. Mulford's receipt of those benefits 
was not admissible. Tr., p. 323, 11.1-7. 
On May 14,2012, the trial convened. R., Vol. II, pp. 367. During voir dire, Presiding Juror 
Lorin Taylor stated his father worked for UP, and he held the opinion that he could and would not 
award any damages for pain and suffering. Mr. Taylor should have been excused for implied bias 
based on his consanguinity with UP and his actual bias for not wanting to award pain and suffering 
damages, but the District Court refused to excuse him. Tr., p. 61, 1.18-p. 62, 1.6; p.87, 1.15-p.90, 1.2; 
p. 106, l.18-p.] 07, 1.19; p.112, 11.6-15; p. 113, 1.22-p. 115,1.1. 
On May ]5,20]2, Mr. Mulford testified. R., p. 369. During his direct examination, Mr. 
Mulford testified about his efforts to find employment. Tr., p.20 I, 1.17-p.202, 1.3. During cross 
examination by UP, over Mr. Mulford's objections, the District Court allowed UP to present 
evidence that Mr. Mulford received RRB benefits. Tr., p.250, 1.16-p.254, 1.5. 
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On May 18,2012, the jury rendered a verdict in favor of UP. R., pp. 382-383. 
Statement of Facts 
1. lVIr. Mulford's injury. 
Mr. Mulford began his employment with UP on June 3,1991. Tr., p.139, 11.9-15. Mr. 
Mulford was employed as a machinist, whose job was to repair UP's equipment. Tr., p.139,l. 24-
p.142, 1.12. 
On March 28, 2009, as Mr. Mulford was at work for UP in Nebraska. He was tasked, in part, 
with repairing a valve on a ballast regulator. Tr.,p.161,1.l2-p.176, 1.7. As Mr. Mulford began his 
work, he tripped over a "bat-wing," an extension ofthe regulator, which UP failed to properly store 
in a safe position. Tr., p. 170, 1.14-p. 171, 1.8. As a result, Mr. Mulford suffered injuries to his 
knees, and he ended up having surgeries on both of his knees. Due to his physical restrictions, UP 
would not allow Mr. Mulford to return back to work. Tr., p.182, 1.21-p.19- p. 194,1.15. 
2. Voir dire and Presiding Juror Lorin Taylor's implied and actual bias. 
On May 14, 2012, the jury trial commenced with voir dire. R., Vol. II, pp.367-368. 
Presiding Juror Lorin Taylor was late. R., Vol. II, p.368; p. 383; Tr., p.58, II. 14-25. The District 
Court questioned Mr. Taylor regarding his relationship with UP, to which he responded: 
THE COURT: Do you have any kind of relationship with the parties such as 
Employer/employee, debtor/creditor, attorney/client, master/servant, that 
kind of relationship? 
*** 
POTENTIAL JUROR #29[Lorin Taylor]: Yes. 
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THE COURT: Tell me what your relationship is. 
[LORIN TAYLOR]: My father's an employee of Union Pacific. 
THE COURT: Your father's an employee of the railroad. All right. 
And so you don't have that relationship. Your father does. 
[LORIN TAYLOR]: Yes. 
Tr., p. 61,1.12-25. The District Court went on to question Mr. Taylor whether his relationship with 
UP would cause him to be biased or ifhe could listen to the evidence and decide the case fairly, to 
which he stated: "1 can help decide it fairly." Tr., p.62, 11.1-6. 
Voir dire continued with Mr. Taylor, in which he was questioned by Mr. Mulford's counsel 
about whether he had a problem with awarding damages for pain and suffering. Mr. Taylor stated 
he had a problem awarding damages for pain and suffering: 
[MR. LARSEN]: The law allows pain and suffering to be compensable. 
That's the judge's instruction that that's one of the items of damages. Are 
there any of you who would say, no, I just won't give you that, Mr. Larsen 
and Mr. Mulford, no matter what you do. 
THE COURT: You have a hand over here. 
MR. LARSEN: Okay. 
THE COURT: Please stand up and tell us your name again. 
POTENTIAL JUROR # 29: Lorin Taylor, juror 29. 
THE COURT: Thank you. 
[LORIN TAYLOR]: It's more personal opinion that I do believe that if 
somebody's going to be covered for lost wages, compensation, hospital bills 
and stufflike that, why further it for pain and suffering? I was injured on the 
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workforce too. I didn't get any lawsuit. I didn't get any money. And that's 
okay, because there's programs out there for everything. And, you know, I 
got my lost wages, but I didn't get any pain and suffering. But the hospital 
bills were paid. 
MR. LARSEN: So in this case for an item of damage of pain and suffering 
could you follow the law'? And if the law, in fact, supports that Mr. 
Mulford is entitled to money damages for pain and suffering, could you 
award that given your experience? 
[MR. TAYLOR]: I don't believe so. 
MR. LARSEN: You couldn't be fair to Mr. Mulford on that issue no matter 
what? 
[MR. TAYLOR): I believe that I can be fair on both sides. Pain and 
suffering is one thing, but if he still gets lost wages, retirement, and 
hospital bills covered, that's a lot of pain and suffering in itself right 
there. 
MR. LARSEN: They're separate damages. And that's why I asked this, 
because I want to make sure that you're going to be fair on every aspect 
of this. And if there's a certain aspect of damage that you just say I 
don't believe in it, cowboy up and move on, I want to know that. That 
would be an indication that you may not be able to follow the judge's 
instructions. 
[LORIN TAYLOR]: Okay. Yeah. I don't believe that pain and sufIering 
should be entered for compensation. 
MR. LARSEN: All right. I'd move for excusing for cause, Your Honor. 
MR. DENSELY: Your Honor, may we approach. 
THE COURT: Just a second. Let me ask a question. Mr. Taylor, in this 
particular case, the judge dictates or tells the jury what the law in Idaho is, 
what the duties are, what the responsibilities of the parties are to each other, 
and what the damages are that can be awarded ifthe evidence supports it. If 
I were to instruct you that certain items of damages are compensable and you 
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believe that the evidence supported those items of damage, would you follow 
my instructions and award the damages that you think the evidence would 
support? 
[LORIN TAYLOR]: Yes. 
THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. You may proceed. 
MR. LARSEN: And that would include an item for pain and suffering? 
[LORIN TAYLOR]: Okay. Like I said, just personal opinion so--
Tr., p. 87, 1.8-p. 90, 1.2 [Emphasis supplied]. Mr. Larsen then went on with further voir dire 
examination. Tr., p.90, 1.3-17. 
During UP's voir dire examination, Mr. Taylor further commented upon his relationship with 
UP, and that his father was ready to retire and was going to have his knees replaced. Mr. Taylor 
stated: 
MR. DENSLEY: All right. Who was the next one? Yes, sir. 
[LORIN TAYLOR]: My mother slipped and fell on some ice and tore her 
meniscus and had surgery. My dad's been at the railroad for 35 years, 
getting ready to take retirement and had to replace both of his knees just due 
to hard work and old age. 
MR. DENSLEY: And what was his craft on the railroad? 
[LORIN TAYLOR]: He worked for a machinist gang for a long time, and 
now he's a foreman. 
MR. DENSLEY: So is he still working for the railroad? 
[LORIN TAYLOR]: Yeah. He'll take full retirement at the end of July. 
MR. DENSLEY: Did you say he had double knee replacements? 
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[LORIN TAYLOR]: He has to get them. He'sjust going to wait until he's 
retired. 
MR. DENSLEY: Oh, 1 see. So that's something that he's going to get 
eventually but he's going to wait until retirement. 
[LORIN TAYLOR]: Yeah, but it's not injury related. It's just due to wear 
and tear. 
Tr., p.1 06.1.16-p. 107,1. 15[Emphasis supplied). Mr. Taylor then went on to state he could act fairly. 
Tr., p. 107, 11.16-17. While the record does not reflect it, as the District Court did not require Mr. 
Taylor to identify himself, Mr. Taylor further stated that in addition to his father, both of his 
grandfathers, three uncles and a brother were members of UP. Tr., p. 112, 11.6-15. 1 
The District Court did not excuse Mr. Taylor for cause and, as previously mentioned, Mr. 
Taylor was the presiding juror of the jury. 
3. Evidence of RRB benefits. 
During his direct examination, Mr. Mulford was asked if he had looked for other 
employment. Mr. Mulford testified as follows: 
Q. [BY MR. GAB lOLA]: Have you looked for any other employment? 
A. Yes, I have. 
Q. What have you looked for? 
It is the trial cOUli's "primary responsibility" to select competent jurors. See, State v. Merrifield, 
109 Idaho 11, 16,704 P.2d 343, 348 (et. App. 1985)(citing, Quincy v. Jt. School Dist. No. 41, iT~fj'a, 
102 Idaho 764. 640 P.2d 304 (1982». It follows that in selecting competent jurors, the trial court 
must create an accurate record, which the district court did not do here in failing to have Mr. Taylor 
identify himself when providing further information as to his consanguinity with UP. 
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A. I've looked for a lot of part-time work, because I would like to get into 
finding out how I would be able to work or if I could even work. So I've 
applied at a lot of auto parts stores, Converges, Sears. I can't remember 
everything but-Home Depot. 
Tr., p. 201, 1.17-p. 202, 1.1. During cross-examination, UP's counsel questioned Mr. Mulford about 
his RRB benefits in relation to his seeking employment, in contradiction to what Mr. Mulford had 
asked the District Court to exclude as evidence at trial. The colloquy went as follows: 
Q. [BY MR. DENSLEY] And you told the jury that you've been applying for 
part time jobs? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And that the reason that you were applying for part-time jobs is because 
you wanted to see if you're able to do the job and maybe work full-time, 
right? 
A. Yes. 
Q. That's not the only reason that you're applying for part-time jobs is it? 
MR. GABIOLA: Your Honor, I'm going to object. This raises an issue that 
we addressed in our motions in limine. 
MR. DENSLEY: They've opened the door to this, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Overruled. Go ahead. 
Q. BY MR. DENSLEY: Mr. Mulford, it's not the only reason is it? It's not 
just because you want to see if you're physically able to do the job. There's 
another reason that you're only applying for part-time work isn't there? 
A. Yes. 
Q. What is that? 
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A. Because I'm limited to only so much amount of money to make. 
MR. GABIOLA: Your Honor, again I'm going to object. 
THE COURT: OvelTuled. 
Q. BY MR. DENSLEY: What is that amount of money? 
MR. GABIOLA: Same objection, Your Honor. This, again, addresses our 
motion in limine. 
THE COURT: That question is a different question. That is sustained. I'll 
sustain the objection on that. 
MR. DENSLEY: All right. 
Q. BY MR. DENSLEY: So there's a limit of the amount of money you can 
make or what happens? 
BY MR. GABIOLA: Your Honor, same objection. IlTelevant. It's also been 
asked and answered. 
THE COURT: It's been asked and answered. Sustained. 
MR. DENSLEY: Ifthafs been asked and answered, I wonder ifMr. Mulford 
could answer it again. I'm not sure what the answer was. 
THE WITNESS: I'm not sure either. 
THE COURT: Okay. Answer it again then. The pending question is: So 
there's a limit of the amount of money that you can make or what happens? 
That's the question that's pending. You can answer that question. 
THE WITNESS: Yes. I can make $780 a month, and if I make any over that 
I lose my retirement. 
Q. BY MR. DENSLEY: Okay. And why would you not apply for-well, 
there is an additional reason why you wouldn't apply for full-time work isn't 
there? 
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A. What would that be? 
Q. Well, you recall applying at Ron's Rocky Mountain Automotive? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Okay. And you testified in your deposition that you only applied for part-
time work? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And you said it was because they didn't pay enough money to make it 
worthwhile. Do you recall that testimony? 
A. To lose my-no, yes, it's true. 
Q. The full-time job? 
A. The full-time job. 
Q. Didn't pay enough money to make it wOlih your while? 
MR. GABIOLA: Objection, Your Honor. Asked and Answered. 
THE COURT: Overruled. 
MR. GABIOLA: Again, it's irrelevant. 
THE COURT: Overruled. 
Q. BY MR. DENSLEY: Do you recall that? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Okay. So why is it that a full-time job-so let's put aside these issues of 
whether or not you could work a full-time job physically and whether or not 
you would lose any money fr0111 your retirement, because, you know, you're 
making too much money. Why is it that full-time work at Ron's Automotive 
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otherwise would not be something that you would want? 
A. Because it makes less money than what I'm getting on my retirement. 
Q. Okay. 
MR. LARSEN: Move to strike, Your Honor, pursuant to the court's previous 
rulings. 
THE COURT: Overruled. 
MR. DENSELY: That's all the questions that I have, Mr. Mulford. Thank 
you. 
Tr., p. 250, 1.13-p.254, 1.7. 
After the District Court allowed UP to elicit testimony from Mr. Mulford about receiving 
RRB benet! ts, and let such evidence go to the jury, Mr. Mulford moved for a mistrial, asserting the 
District Court erred in allowing evidence ofMr. Mulford's RRB benefits-which were irrelevant and 
prejudicial--to go to the jury. The District Court overruled the objections and denied the mistrial, 
reasoning that Mr. Mulford opened the door by testifying as to the reason he was only looking for 
part-time work. The colloquy went as follows: 
MR. GABIOLA: Your Honor, .. .I'd like to take a matter up outside the 
presence of the jury. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
*** 
(Outside the presence of the jury.) 
THE COURT: Take up your matter. 
MR. GABIOLA: Your Honor, we were objecting so much, and I don't think 
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it should be a sllqJrise to the court, the purpose of our objection related to the 
RRB benefits, 
THE COURT: I understand that. 
MR. GABIOLA: And the message that the jury got, which we objected to in 
our motions in limine and the basis here was that's more prej udicial than 
probative. 
THE COURT: I understand that Mr. Gabiola. The reason that I sustained-or 
overruled your objections is that your-if Mr. Mulford had not testified on 
direct examination as to the reason he was only looking for part-time work, 
then none ofthat would have come in. But once you asked him that question 
and he said the reason that he only went for part-time work is because-the 
only reason is because he wanted to see if he could do it, that opened the 
door. The defendant at that point in time is certainly entitled to identify for 
the jury that he's got other reasons that he does not-he's only seeking part-
time work. That's -mitigation is an issue here. I wouldn't have allowed it 
based on my earlier rulings except for the fact that that's how he testified on 
direct. That's the problem. 
MR. GABIOLA: Well, Your Honor, I'm going to make a motion. 
THE COURT: That opened the door. 
MR. GABIOLA: I'm going to move the court for a mistrial. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. GABfOLA: And preserve my record for appeal. 
THE COURT: Very good. Your motion for a mistrial is denied. That's the 
basis for my ruling. The point here is that he was asked whether or not on 
direct examination the reason that be only asked for part-time work -or only 
looked for part-time work. Once that door is open, then the defense is 
entitled to inquire. 
Tr., p. 256, l.! O-p.258, l. 9. Later on during the trial, the District Court commented on allowing Mr. 
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Mulford to testify as to his RRB benefits, stating: 
It strikes me that there should be a limitation on any reference to what was 
clearly a credibility part of his testimony in terms of the reasons that he was 
using for only seeking part-time work in his testimony yesterday. But there 
should not be substantive testimony as to what the actual value of part-time 
work is, the types of jobs that he could do for part-time work, or the reasons 
that he's only seeking part-time work since the plaintifJ is assuming a full-
time position for both his lost income claims past and future. 
*** 
All right. Let me make a record just so-because we always have to make a 
record. We don't do this for anybody but the Supreme Court. This is my 
view. My view is that the testimony of the plaintiff as it went to the reasons 
for-the reasons that he was not seeking anything more than part-time work 
goes to his credibility. Because he offered an explanation, but it wasil 't the 
full explanation. And because I felt he'd opened the door on that I allowed 
the defendant to inquire are there any other reasons and he offered the 
testimony that he did?[sic]. We talked about it as RRB. He never said 
Railroad Retirement Benefits. He just said retirement benefits or benefits or 
something like that. And so they don't know what it is or how much it is, 
and we have the testimony of Mr. Opp that if he had worked-continued to 
work until age 66, he could have put more money into the retirement benefit, 
and he's lost that. So I think that's kind of offset I think in terms of the 
testimony. But in terms of substantive testimony, I felt like his answers 
particularly as it mentioned specific amounts were beyond the scope of the 
question, were not responsive. I offered to the plaintiffs to strike that or give 
a cautionary instruction. You declined that for fear that it would further taint 
the jury to add emphasis to it. And I understand that, but at least that offer 
was made and declined. And so the question is now is it substantive 
testimony to which an expert can respond? And my view from the outset, the 
RRB was a collateral source. Clearly collateral source evidence is almost 
never admissible and shouldn't have been in this case, and I've made that 
ruling in the motions in limine for that specific reason. So my view is that 
his testimony goes to his credibility, but it doesn't-it's not substantive in the 
sense of what are his damages, which is really what the mi tigation question 
1S. 
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Tr., p. 263, I. 24-p.264, I. 9; p.321, 1.21-p.323, 1.11. The District Court also instructed that UP could 
not, through its vocational rehabilitation expert, make reference to RRB benefits. Tr., p. 323, 1.12-p. 
324,1.17. 
The jury returned a verdict in favor of UP against Mr. Mulford. R., Vol. II, pp. 382-83. 
ISSUES ON APPEAL 
1. Did the District Court err in failing to comply with its duty to excuse for cause, 
pursuant to Idaho Code Idaho Code §§ 19-2019 and 19-2020(1) and Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 
47(h)(2) in seating a biased and partial jury, when it allowed Presiding Juror Lorin Taylor to be a 
juror who was the son of an employee of UP, and as such held consanguinity within the fourth 
degree to UP? 
2. Did the District Court err in failing to comply with its duty to excuse for cause, 
pursuant to Idaho Code Idaho Code §19-2019(2) and Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 47(h)(7) in 
scating a biased and partial juror, Presiding Juror Lorin Taylor, where Mr. Taylor's personal belief 
and actual bias precluded him from awarding pain and suffering damages? 
3. Did the District court err in allowing UP to present collateral source evidence to the 
jUlY, i.e .. that Mr. Mulford was receiving Railroad Retirement Benefits, such that the jury was 
prejudiced against Mr. Mulford, especially given the special knowledge of Presiding Juror Lorin 
Taylor, resulting in the jury rendering a verdict in favor of UP? 
4. Is Mr. Mulford entitled to attorney's fees and costs on appeal, pursuant to Idaho Code 
~ 12-121 and Idaho Appellate Rules 40 and 41? 
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ARGUMENT 
A. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN NOT COMPLYING WITH ITS 
STATUTORY DUTY TO EXCUSE MR. TAYLOR FOR CAUSE BASED ON 
HIS IMPLIED AND ACTUAL BIAS. 
The record unequivocally shows that Presiding Juror Lorin Taylor had implied bias due to 
the consanguinity within the fourth degree with UP. There is no question, Mr. Taylor's father was 
a UP employee, and potentially his other relatives were as well. Mr. Taylor also disclosed that his 
own personal bias prevented him from being able to award pain and suffering as damages. Pursuant 
to Idaho Code §§19-2019 and 19-2020(1) and Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 47(h)(2) and (7), the 
District Court had a duty to excuse Mr. Taylor for cause based on his implied and actual bias. The 
District Court did not excuse Mr. Taylor, and, in its failure, abused its discretion thereby committing 
reversible enor. 
1. Relevant Law. 
a. Right to trial by impartial jury. 
The Constitution ofthe United States, Amendment VII, and the Constitution of the state of 
Idaho, Article 1, §7 both grant the parties to a civil suit the right to a trial by an impartial jury. 
Further, pursuant to Article I, § 7, the right to trial by jury "shall remain inviolate." Additionally, 
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 38(a), provides the parties to a civil suit the right to a jury trial. A 
party's "inviolate" right to an impartial jury is achieved by excusing for cause any juror admitting 
to or harboring implied and/or actual bias. 
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b. Challenges for cause due to implied and actual bias. 
The Idaho legislature fUIiher codified the right to a trial by an impartial jury, by enacting 
Idaho Code~§ 19-2019 and 19-2020( 1), which mandate excusing a potential juror for implied and 
actual bias. Section 19-2019 provides: 
Particular causes of challenge. Particular causes of challenge are of two kinds: 
l. For such a bias as, when the existence of the fact is ascertained, in 
judgment of law disqualifies the juror, and which is known in this code as 
implied bias. 
2. For the existence of a state of mind on the part of the juror in reference to 
the case, or to either of the parties, which, in the exercise of a sound 
discretion on the part of the trier, leads to the inference that he will not act 
with entire impartiality, and which is known in this code as actual bias. 
[Bold in original]. 
Section 19-2020( 1) defines a form of implied biased based on a potential juror's relationship to a 
party: 
Grounds of challenge for implied bias. A challenge for implied bias may 
be taken for all or any of the following causes and for no other: 
1. Consanguinity or affinity within the fourth degree to the person alleged to 
be injured by the offense charged, or on whose complaint the prosecution 
was instituted, or to the defendant. 
[Bold in original] [Underscore supplied]. 
In addition, the Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 47(h) gives parties the right to a trial an 
impartial jury, as it mandates excusing a prospective juror for cause. Rule 47(h) provides, in 
relevant part, as follows: 
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Challenges for cause shall be heard and detennined by the court after voir 
dire examination of each prospective juror or of all prospective jurors. The 
grounds for challenge for cause are as follows: 
*** 
2. Consanguinity or affinity. within the fourth degree to any pal1y. 
*** 
7. The existence of a state of mind in the juror evincing enmity or bias to or 
against either party. 
In addition, Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 47(i) requires, in relevant part, that "[ c ]hallenges 
for cause, as provided by law, must be tried by the court." 
c. A trial court's duty to select an impartial jury. 
"[TJhe primary responsibility for voir dire and the selection of competent jurors rests upon 
the trial judge." Quincy v. Jt. School Dist. No. 41, Benewah County, 102 Idaho 764, 770, 640 P.2d 
304, 308 (1981 ).2 The decision of whether a juror can render a fair and impartial verdict is left to 
the discretion of the trial court and will not be reversed absent a showing of an abuse of discretion. 
State \'. Hauser, 143 Idaho 609, 150 P.3d 296, 302 (Ct. App. 2006) .. ' 
The facts in Quinc)' are distinguishable from this matter. In that case, the plaintiff requested a 
potential juror, whose wife worked for the defendant and who had discussed the case with his wife, 
be excused for cause. The trial court there never questioned the potential juror's implied bias as to 
the affinity between him and the defendant. 
This Court has held it is not an abuse of discretion for a trial court to refuse to excuse a juror for 
cause, where the juror assures the court he/she will remain fair and impatiial. Nightengale v. 
Timmel, 151 Idaho 347, 353, 256 P.3d 755, 761 (2011)(citing, Morris v. Thomson, 130 Idaho 138, 
937 P.2d 1212 (1997)). 
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Essential for ajury to properly function is that its members are impartial. As the Idaho Court 
of Appeals stated: 
The greatest uncertainty that an accused's constitutional right to an impartial 
jury will be safeguarded is achieved by excusing for cause jurors ,vho, after 
admitting bias, do no more than make equivocal assurances of an effort 
to be impartiaL 
Hauser, supra, 143 Idaho at 610, 150 P.3d at 303 (Ct. App. 2006)( emphasis supplied). In Hauser, 
the cOUli held it was an abuse of discretion for a trial court not to excuse ajuror who showed actual 
bias, and, thus, deprived the defendant of his constitutional right to an impartial jury. The Court 
reasoned that it was reversible error by the trial court in failing to excuse for cause a juror who 
admitted he would give more weight to a sheriff over the defendant and would try to put this bias 
aside. Id., 143 Idaho at 610-11,150 P.3d at 303-4. The court further reasoned: 
"When a juror is unable to state that she will serve fairly and impartially 
despite being asked repeatedly for such assurances, we can have no 
confidence that the juror will' lay aside' her biases or her prejudicial personal 
experiences and render a fair and impartial verdict." Thompson v. Altheimer 
& Gray, 248 F.3d 621, 627 (7th Cir.200l) (quoting United States v. 
Gonzalez, 214 F.3d 1109, 1114 (9th Cir.2000)) (emphasis added). If the trial 
court resolves any doubt on the side of disqualification, "[ t ]he worst the court 
will have done in most cases is to have replaced one impartial juror with 
another impartial juror," People v. Johnson, 94 N.Y.2d 600, 709 N.Y.S.2d 
134, 730 N.E.2d 932, 941 (2000), whereas resolving doubt in favor of 
retaining the juror can result in the deprivation of a fair trial. We agree 
with those courts that have concluded that any justified doubt that a 
venireman can "stand indifferent in the cause" ought to be resolved in favor 
of the accused. Justus v. Commonwealth, 220 Va. 971, 266 S.E.2d 87, 90 
(1980). Sec also Gonzalez, 214 F.3d at 1114. This resolution gives full effect 
to the language in I.e. § 19-2019(2), which calls for disqualification of a 
juror who exhibits a state of mind that "leads to the inference that he will not 
act with entire impartiality." In our view, when a juror admits bias, and 
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gives no unequivocal assurance of the ability to be impartial despite 
several efforts by the court or counsel to elicit such an assurance, an 
inference that he will not act with entire impartiality becomes 
inescapable. 
Hauser, 143 Idaho at 610,150 P.3d at 303 [Emphasis supplied]. 
It is the trial court's duty to excuse a juror for cause, when it appears a juror is disqualified 
under the aforementioned statutes. Furthermore, a pat1y should not be forced to exercise a 
peremptory challenge to excuse a potential juror who is disqualified for cause. As stated by this 
Court in SLOddard v. Nelson: 
[A] litigant should not be forced to exercise a peremptory challenge to 
exclude the prospective juror when it clearly appears that (the prospective 
juror) is disqualified for cause. 
ld., 99 Idaho 293, 296, 581 P.2d 339, 342 (1978): 
2. As Presiding Juror Lorin Taylor's father was an employee of UP, he held an 
implied bias against Mr. Mulford, such that the District Court abused its 
discretion and committed reversible error in refusing to excuse him for cause. 
The record unequivocally establishes that Presiding Juror Lorin Taylor held consanguinity 
with UP, such that he should have been excused for cause by the District Court. Mr. Taylor's father 
was employed by UP. Tr., p. 61, 11.12-25. Additionally, while the District Court failed to clarify 
Mr. Taylor's other relationship to UP, it appears that Mr. Taylor's grandfathers, three uncles and a 
brother were members of UP. Tr., p. 112,11. 6-15. This cel1ainly qualifies as consanguinity under 
Idaho Code ~ 19-2020(1), and Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 47(h)(2), such that the District Court 
was required to excuse Mr. Taylor for cause. As the court in Hauser reasoned, "resolving doubt 
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in favor of retaining a juror can result in deprivation of a fair trial." ld., 143 Idaho at 610, 150 P.3d 
at 303. Here, Mr. Taylor harbored implied bias due to his consanguinity with UP. The remedy was 
simple: excuse Mr. Taylor and replace him with an impartial juror, free of implied bias. However, 
the District Court refused to utilize this simple remedy. Instead, the District Court ignored its duty 
to empanel an impartial jury, and refused to excuse Mr. Taylor. The District Court's refusal 
deprived Mr. Mulford from having a fair trial, resulting in reversible error. Mr. Mulford is entitled 
to have this case remanded with instructions to the District Court for a new trial. 
3. As Presiding Juror Lorin Taylor held actual bias against Mr. Mulford by not 
personally believing in awarding damages for pain and suffering, the District 
Court abused its discretion and committed reversible error in refusing to excuse 
him for cause. 
In addition to the District Court's failure to comply with its duty to excuse Mr. Taylor due 
to his implied bias based on consanguinity, it also committed reversible error in failing to excuse 
Mr. Taylor for actual bias. Mr. Taylor admitted, based on his "personal opinion," that he could and 
would not award any damages for pain and suffering, as he "[did not] believe that pain and suffering 
should be entered for compensation." Tr., p. 87, 1.8-p. 90, 1.2. This qualified as actual bias under 
Idaho Code ~ 19-2019(2) and Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 47(h)(7). 
While the District Court questioned Mr. Taylor regarding this bias and, despite Mr. Taylor's 
repeated admissions he could not be impartial, the District Court informed Mr. Taylor that he was 
to follow its instructions. Tr., p. 87,1.8-90,1.2. The District Court made Mr. Taylor a liar, or forced 
him to dishonor his oath to tell the truth. Mr. Taylor told the truth, as he unequivocally admitted he 
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was biased by his familial relationship to UP and his deeply held personal beliefs that plaintiffs 
should not get pain and suffering damages. 
The lecture from the District Court to Mr. Taylor, in the form of a question, did no more to 
change Mr. Taylor's bias than lecturing a dog that it is a cat. The dog continues to tell you he is a 
dog and because ajudge says, "No, you are a cat," does not change the dog to a cat, even ifthe dog 
finally agrees. The dog-cat analogy is exactly what Mr. Taylor did. He tried to be honest and honor 
his oath to tell the truth. His honest answers showed he was not qualified to serve as an impartial 
juror. The District Court ignored the honest answers and gave a question in the form of a short 
lecture that Mr. Taylor would do as he was told, to which Mr. Taylor simply said, "yes." There is 
no indication in the record, and none offered by Mr. Taylor the he had seen a "light," had a change 
of heart or had abandoned his long held belief. He was simply saying, "1' m a dog, but if you say 
I am a cat, you are the judge, I simply told you what I was." 
Again, the District Court had the simple remedy of excusing Mr. Taylor and selecting an 
impartial juror to replace him. However, as is evident from the record, the District Court ignored 
this simple remedy and chose to allow Mr. Taylor to remain on the jury. Once again, the District 
Court failed to follow its duty to select an impartial jury, deprived Mr. Mulford of his right to an 
impartial jury, abused its discretion and committed reversible error. Mr. Mulford is entitled to this 
Court remanding the case back to the District Court for a new trial. 
B. THE DISTRICT COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN 
ALLOWING EVIDENCE OF RRB BENEFITS, A COLLATERAL SOURCE, 
TO GO TO THE JURY. 
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Prior to triaL Mr. Mulford moved in limine to prevent UP from introducing evidence of his 
receiving RRB benefits. R., Vol. I, pp. 20-178. Mr. Mulford asserted that RRB benefits were a 
"collateral source" and inadmissible at trial. 
states: 
Evidence ofRRB benefits is inadmissable pursuant to Idaho Code § 6-1606. Section 6-1606 
In any action for personal injury or property damage, a judgment may be 
entered for the claimant only for damages which exceed amounts received by 
the claimant from collateral sources as compensation for the personal injury 
or property damage, whether from private, group or governmental sources, 
and whether contributory or noncontributory. For the purposes of this 
section, collateral sources shall not include benefits paid under federal 
programs which by law must seek subrogation, death benefits paid under life 
insurance contracts, benefits paid by a service corporation organized under 
chapter 34, title 41, Idaho Code, and benefits paid which are recoverable 
under subrogation rights created under Idaho law or by contract. Evidence 
of payment collateral sources is admissible to the court after the finder 
of fact has rendered an award. Such award shall be reduced by the court 
to the extent the award includes compensation for damages which have been 
compensated independently from collateral sources. [Emphasis supplied]. 
Federal courts have held RRB benefits are inadmissible as a collateral source. See, Eichel 
V. NeVil York Centra! Railroad, 375 U.S. 253, 255 (1963). In Eichel, like in this case, the railroad 
sought to introduce evidence at trial that the plaintiff received disability benefits under the Railroad 
Retirement Act for the purpose of impeaching plaintiff's testimony regarding his alleged motivation 
in not returning to work. Eichel 375 U.S. at 253-54. The U.S. Supreme Court held that the 
collateral source rule bars evidence of benefits and payments received by injured railroad employees 
fi'om sources independent oftheirrailroad employers, because the prejudicial effect of such evidence 
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and its potential for jury misuse far outweighs its probative value. !d. at 255; See also Tipton v. 
SOCOI1Y Mobile Oil Inc., 375 U.S. 34,37 (1963) (trial court committed reversible enor in allowing 
defendant to introduce collateral source evidence). 
Both the Ninth and the Tenth Circuit Courts of Appeals have similarly held that, under 
Eichel, collateral source evidence is inadmissible in FELA trials. See, Sheehy v. Southern Pacific 
Transportation Co., 631 F.2d 649, 652 (9th Cir. 1980); Green v. Denver and Rio Grand Western 
Railvvay Co., 59 F.3d 1029, 1032 (lOth Cir. 1995). Moreover, in Green, supra, the Tenth Circuit 
held the trial court committed reversible error because "Eichel compels the conclusion that the 
collateral source rule prohibits admission ofRRA disability benefits in a FELA case." Id., 59 F.3d 
at 1032-33. Further, the court in Green held that "public policy favors giving the plaintiff a double 
recovery rather than allowing a wrongdoer to enjoy reduced liability simply because the plaintiff 
received compensation from an independent source." Id. 
Evidence that Mr. Mulford received RRB benefits, a collateral source, was irrelevant, as well 
as more prejudicial than probative, pursuant to Idaho Rules of Evidence 401,402 and 403. Rule 401 
provides: 
"Relevant Evidence" means evidence having any tendency to make the 
existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action 
more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence. 
Rule 402 provides: 
All relevant evidence is admissible except as otherwise provided by these 
rules or by other rules applicable in the courts of this state. Evidence which 
is not relevant is not admIssible. 
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Further, Rule 403 provides: 
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is 
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the 
issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of 
time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence. 
During trial, the District Court concluded that such benefits qualified as a collateral source 
and evidence of Mr. Mulford's receipt of those benefits was not admissible. Tr., p. 323, 11.1-7. 
Nevertheless, the District Court allowed UP, over Mr. Mulford's objections, to present evidence to 
the jury that Mr. Mulford was receiving RRB benefits. Tr., p. 250, 1.13-p. 254, 1.7. While the 
District Court reasoned Mr. Mulford opened the door, Mr. Mulford testified that he was looking for 
part-time work, which did not open the door to allowing UP to present evidence that Mr. Mulford 
was receiving RRB benefits. Mr. Mulford simply testified in opposition to UP's mitigation defense, 
which it asserted, that Mr. Mulford had to look for other work to mitigate his damages. Under the 
District Court's rationale, Mr. Mulford's testimony that he had looked for other work was enough 
to open the dOOL and sent the message that Mr. Mulford would and should not have provided any 
testimony about his efforts to find other employment, thereby exposing him to UP running rampant 
with the jury that he never made any attempt to mitigate his damages. This created a "Catch-22" for 
Mr. Mulford. Under either scenario, as forced by the District Court, Mr. Mulford loses, and most 
certainly did here, as evident from the jury's verdict. 
While the District COUli reasoned that Mr. Mulford never testified he received "RRB" 
benefits, that is an untenable position, given the knowledge and background of Presiding Juror Lorin 
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Taylor. Mr. Taylor admitted in voir dire that his father, while still working for UP at the time of 
trial, was going to take full retirement. Tr., p.6, 11. 12-25; p.l 06, 1.16-p. 107,1.15. It is clear that Mr. 
Taylor, with this background and knowledge of UP obviously informed and instructed the jury that 
Mr. Mulford was receiving RRB benefits culminating in its decision to render its verdict against 
him. Certainly, the fact that the jury had evidence ofMr. Mulford's RRB benefits wrongufully 
prejudiced the jury against Mr. Mulford. Additionally, Mr. Taylor's background knowledge of UP , 
his actual bias against awarding pain and suffering, and his influence, combined with evidence that 
Mr. Mulford was receiving RRB benefits, further prejudiced the jury against Mr. Mulford. This in 
turn resulted in the jury retu1l1ing a verdict in favor of UP against Mr. Mulford. Under these 
circLlmstances, Mr. Mulford did not receive a fair trial and the matter should be remanded for him 
to receive a new one. 
C. MR. MULFORD IS ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS ON 
APPEAL. 
Mr. Mulford is entitled to attorney's fees and costs under Idaho Code §12-121 and Idaho 
Appellate Rules 40 and 41. Idaho Code § 12-121 and LA.R. 41 allow for the award of attorney's fees 
and costs in a civil action where a matter was defended frivolously, unreasonably and without 
foundation. LA.R. 40 allows for the award of costs to the prevailing paliy on appeal. 
Mr. Mulford submits that the District Court's errors in failing to excuse Mr. Taylor as ajuror 
for cause, pursuant to Idaho Code §§ 19-2019 and 19-2020(1) and Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 
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47(h). The record unequivocally shows Mr. Taylor had consanguinity with UP within the fourth 
degree. Mr. Taylor's father was an employee of UP, such that he should have been excused for 
implied bias. Further, pursuant to Idaho Code § 19-20 19(2), Mr. Taylor held the state of mind, as 
established by his sworn statement during voir dire, that he could not act with entire impartiality and 
was biased. Mr. Taylor clearly stated that he could not be impartial, as his personal opinions and 
beliefs were such that he would not and could not award damages for pain and suffering. The 
District Court's failure to uphold and conform with its statutory duty to excuse Mr. Taylor is 
reversible error. 
Additionally, the District Court allowed UP to offer evidence to the jury ofMr. Mulford's 
RRB benefits, a collateral source. This prejudicial and inelevant evidence prejudiced the jury 
unfairly against Mr. Mulford. Further, such evidence, combined with the fact that Mr. Taylor's 
father was a UP employee waiting for his retirement, and Mr. Taylor's aforementioned personal bias 
against compensating for pain and suffering, culminated in the jury's verdict against Mr. Mulford. 
The jury surely considered that Mr. Mulford was already receiving benefits from UP in reaching 
its verdict. For these reasons, Mr. Mulford is entitled to attorney's fees and costs on appeal. 
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CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, Mr. Mulford respectfully requests that the Court remand the case 
back to the District Court for a new trial. 
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